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Abstract
Adversarial images aim to change a target
model’s decision by minimally perturbing a
target image. In the black-box setting, the ab-
sence of gradient information often renders
this search problem costly in terms of query
complexity. In this paper we propose to re-
strict the search for adversarial images to a
low frequency domain. This approach is readily
compatible with many existing black-box at-
tack frameworks and consistently reduces their
query cost by 2 to 4 times. Further, we can cir-
cumvent image transformation defenses even
when both the model and the defense strategy
are unknown. Finally, we demonstrate the ef-
ficacy of this technique by fooling the Google
Cloud Vision platform with an unprecedented
low number of model queries.
1 INTRODUCTION
As machine learning models enjoy widespread adoption,
their security becomes a relevant topic for consideration.
Recent studies have shown that existing methods lack
robustness against imperceptible changes to the input
[Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2014], and many
deployed computer vision and speech recognition systems
have been compromised [Carlini and Wagner, 2018; Cisse
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2016; Melis
et al., 2017]. This presents a realistic security threat in
critical applications such as autonomous driving, where
an adversary may manipulate road signs to cause control
malfunction while remaining hidden to the naked eye
[Evtimov et al., 2017].
Most existing attack algorithms, both white-box [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and
Frossard, 2016; Szegedy et al., 2014] and black-box
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Figure 1: A sample low frequency adversarial image pro-
duced by black-box attack.
[Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge, 2017; Chen et al., 2017;
Ilyas et al., 2018; Tu et al., 2018], function by searching
the full space of possible perturbations to find noise pat-
terns that alter the behavior of convolutional filters. In this
high dimensional space many solutions exist and search
algorithms tend to almost exclusively result in high fre-
quency solutions, i.e. small pixel-wise perturbations dis-
persed across an image. White-box attacks can be guided
by gradient information and tend to have low query com-
plexity (as low as 10 gradients on ResNet/ImageNet).In
contrast, black-box attacks do not enjoy such benefits.
For example, the search for successful ResNet/ImageNet
attacks still requires on the order of 104 − 105 queries.
Motivated by these shortcomings, we propose a radical
departure from the existing, high-frequency adversarial
perturbation attacks and we explicitly restrict the search
space of adversarial directions to the low frequency sub-
space. Constructing low frequency adversarial perturba-
tion has several advantages: As black-box attacks gen-
erally require random sampling in the image space, its
high-dimensionality causes the attack algorithm to sample
many non-adversarial directions, resulting in a high query
complexity on the order of the image dimensionality. In
the low frequency subspace adversarial directions may oc-
cur in much higher density – lowering query complexity
significantly. Moreover, many successful defenses against
black-box attacks rely on removing high frequency signal
with a low-pass filter [Dziugaite, Ghahramani, and Roy,
2016; Guo et al., 2017; Xu, Evans, and Qi, 2017], and op-
erating in low frequency space promises to bypass these
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image transformation defenses.
In this paper we show that adversarial perturbations do
indeed exist abundantly in a very low-dimensional low
frequency subspace. We demonstrate that two popular
black-box attacks – the boundary attack [Brendel, Rauber,
and Bethge, 2017] and the natural evolution strategies
(NES) attack [Ilyas et al., 2018] – can be readily restricted
to such a low frequency domain. Figure 1 shows a sample
black-box adversarial image with low frequency perturba-
tion produced by the boundary attack. Our experiments
demonstrate that a dimensionality reduction to a mere
1/64 of the original space still yields near-optimal ad-
versarial perturbations. Experimental results confirm our
conjectured benefits in the black-box setting:
1. The boundary attack with low frequency perturbation
requires dramatically fewer model queries to find an ad-
versarial image. The modified attack produces adversarial
images with imperceptible change on ImageNet (ResNet-
50 [He et al., 2016]) after approximately 1000 median
number of model queries – a 4x reduction compared to
vanilla boundary attack.
2. The NES attack enjoys significant improvement of
query efficiency with this simple modification, resulting
in a consistent 2x speed-up across all images. The median
number of queries required for a targeted black-box attack
using low frequency NES is only around 12, 000.
3. Using low frequency perturbation circumvents image
transformation defenses such as JPEG compression [Dzi-
ugaite, Ghahramani, and Roy, 2016] and bit depth reduc-
tion [Xu, Evans, and Qi, 2017], which have not exhibited
vulnerability to black-box attacks prior to our work.
4. Finally, we employ the low frequency boundary at-
tack to fool the Google Cloud Vision platform with an
unprecedented 1000 model queries — demonstrating its
cost effectiveness and real world applicability.
2 BACKGROUND
In the study of adversarial examples in image classifica-
tion, the goal of an attacker is to alter the model’s predic-
tion by adding an imperceptible perturbation to a natural
image. Formally, for a given classification model h and an
image x on which the model correctly predicts y = h(x),
the adversary aims to find a perturbed image x′ that solves
the following constrained optimization problem:
min
x′
δ(x,x′) subject to h(x′) 6= y.
The function δ measures the perceptual difference be-
tween the original and adversarial images, and is often ap-
proximated by mean squared error (MSE), the Euclidean
norm ‖ · ‖2 or the max-norm ‖ · ‖∞. An attack is consid-
ered successful if the perturbed image is imperceptibly
different, i.e., δ(x,x′) ≤ ρ for some small ρ > 0. This
attack goal defines an untargeted attack, since the attack
goal is to alter the prediction on the perturbed image to
any incorrect class h(x′) 6= y. In contrast, a targeted
attack aims to produce perturbed images that the model
predicts as some pre-specified target class.
When constructing adversarial images, the attacker may
have various degrees of knowledge about the model h,
including the training data and/or procedure, model archi-
tecture, or even all of its parameters. The attack may also
adaptively query h on chosen inputs before producing the
adversarial images and obtain gradients from h. These
different threat models can be roughly categorized into
white-box, where the attacker has full knowledge about
h and how it is trained, or black-box, where the attacker
can only query h, and has limited knowledge about its
architecture or training procedure.
White-box attacks. When given access to the model en-
tirely, the adversary may minimize the correct class pre-
diction probability directly to cause misclassification [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy,
2015; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2016; Madry
et al., 2017]. For a given input x and correct class y, the
adversary defines a loss function `y(x′) so that the loss
value is low when h(x′) 6= y. One example of such ` is
the margin loss
`y(x
′) = max
(
Z(x′)y −max
y′ 6=y
Z(x′)y′ + κ, 0
)
(1)
used in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], where Z is the logit
output of the network. The loss diminishes to zero only if
the logit of at least one class exceeds that of the correct
class, y, by κ or more. The adversary can then solve
min
x′
`y(x
′) + λδ(x,x′)
with a suitable hyperparameter λ to constrain the pertur-
bation to be small while ensuring misclassification.
Black-box attacks. In certain scenarios, the white-box
threat model does not reflect the true capability of an
attacker. For example, when attacking machine learning
services such as Google Cloud Vision, the attacker only
has access to a limited number of function calls against
the target model, and does not have knowledge about the
training data. Transfer-based attacks [Liu et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2017; Tramèr et al., 2017] utilize a sub-
stitute model that the attacker trains to imitate the target
model, and constructs adversarial examples on the sub-
stitute model using white-box attacks. For this attack to
succeed, the target model must be similar to the substi-
tute model and is trained on the same data distribution.
Gradient estimation attacks use techniques such as fi-
nite difference [Chen et al., 2017; Tu et al., 2018] and
natural evolution strategies [Ilyas et al., 2018; Ilyas, En-
gstrom, and Madry, 2018] to estimate the gradient from
input-output pairs, thus enabling gradient-based white-
box attacks. This type of attack requires the model to
output class scores or probabilities, and generally requires
a number of model queries proportional to the image size.
In contrast, decision-based attacks [Brendel, Rauber, and
Bethge, 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018] utilize only the discrete
classification decisions from a model and is applicable in
all scenarios, but is generally more difficult to execute.
3 LOW FREQUENCY IMAGE
SUBSPACE
The inherent query inefficiency of gradient estimation and
decision-based attacks stems from the need to search over
or randomly sample from the high-dimensional image
space. Thus, their query complexity depends on the rela-
tive adversarial subspace dimensionality compared to the
full image space. One way to improve these methods is to
find a low-dimensional subspace that contains a high den-
sity of adversarial examples, which enables more efficient
sampling of useful attack directions.
Methods in image compression, in particular the cele-
brated JPEG codec [Wallace, 1991], have long exploited
the fact that most of the critical content-defining informa-
tion in natural images live in the low end of the frequency
spectrum, whereas high frequency signal is often associ-
ated with noise. It is therefore plausible to assume that
CNNs are trained to respond especially to low-frequency
patterns in order to extract class-specific signatures from
images. Hence, we propose to target CNN based ap-
proaches by restricting the search space for adversarial
directions to the low-frequency spectrum – essentially
targeting these class defining signatures directly.
Discrete cosine transform. The JPEG codec utilizes the
discrete cosine transform (DCT), which decomposes a
signal into cosine wave components, to represent a natural
image in frequency space. More precisely, given a 2D
image X ∈ Rd×d, define basis functions
φd(i, j) = cos
[
pi
d
(
i+
1
2
)
j
]
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d. The DCT transform V = DCT(X) is:
Vj1,j2 = Nj1Nj2
d−1∑
i1=0
d−1∑
i2=0
Xi1,i2φd(i1, j1)φd(i2, j2),
whereNj =
√
1
d if j = 0 andNj =
√
2
d otherwise. Here,
Nj1 , Nj2 are normalization terms included to ensure the
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Figure 2: (Left) Comparison of (attack) success rate af-
ter perturbation by random spherical noise in RGB vs.
LF-DCT space. Using low frequency noise improves the
success rate dramatically. (Right) Area under the success
rate-ρ curve. The highest density of adversarial images
appears to lie around r = 1/8.
transformation is isometric, i.e. ‖X‖2 = ‖DCT(X)‖2.
The entry Vi,j corresponds to the magnitude of wave
φd(i, j), with lower frequencies represented by lower i, j.
Further, DCT is invertible, with inverse X = IDCT(V ),
Xi1,i2 =
d−1∑
j1=0
d−1∑
j2=0
Nj1Nj2Vj1,j2φd(i1, j1)φd(i2, j2).
(2)
For images containing multiple color channels, both DCT
and IDCT can be applied channel-wise independently.
Sampling low frequency noise. In order to facilitate ef-
ficient search for attack directions in low frequency space,
we need to be able to sample random perturbations con-
fined to this subspace. We can achieve this with the in-
verse DCT transform by considering the top-left rd× rd
entries of V for some ratio parameter r ∈ (0, 1]. These
coefficients correspond to cosine waves with long periods,
hence low frequency. Given any distribution D (e.g. uni-
form, or Gaussian) over Rd×d, we can sample a random
matrix η˜ ∈ Rd×d in frequency space so that
η˜i,j =
{
xi,j ∼ D if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ rd
0 otherwise.
Using the inverse DCT mapping, the corresponding noise
“image” in pixel space is defined by η = IDCT(η˜). By
definition, η has non-zero cosine wave coefficients only in
frequencies lower than rd. When the pixel space contains
multiple color channels, we can sample each channel
independently using the same strategy. We denote this
distribution of low frequency noise as IDCTr(D) and the
sub-space as low frequency DCT (LF-DCT) space.
Low frequency noise success rate. We postulate that
CNNs are more sensitive to changes in the LF-DCT sub-
space, hence admitting a higher density of adversarial
perturbations. To empirically substantiate this hypothesis,
we compare the success rate of random noise in RGB vs.
LF-DCT space for a ResNet-50 architecture [He et al.,
2016]. We sample the noise vector η uniformly from the
surface of the unit sphere of radius ρ > 0 in the rd× rd
LF-DCT space and project it back to RGB through the
IDCT transform. For r = 1 this procedure is identical to
sampling directly on the surface of a unit sphere in pixel
space, as IDCT is a linear, orthonormal transformation.
Figure 2 (left) shows these success rates as a function of
the root mean squared error (RMSE = ρ√
3d
) between the
perturbed and original image, averaged over 1000 ran-
domly chosen images from ImageNet [Deng et al., 2009].
Several trends emerge: 1. As expected, the success rate
increases with the magnitude of perturbation ρ across all
values of r; 2. There appears to be a sweet spot around
r = 1/8, which corresponds to a reduction of dimension-
ality by 1/64; 3. The worst success rate is achieved with
r = 1, which corresponds to no dimensionality reduction
(and is identical to sampling in the original RGB space).
To further investigate the dimensionality “sweet spot”,
the right plot shows the area under the success rate vs.
RMSE curve for various values of r, within a fixed range
of ρ ∈ [0, 20]. Here, a higher value corresponds to a faster
increase in success rate with larger perturbation radius. In
agreement with the left plot, the optimal frequency ratio
is around r = 1/8.
3.1 Universality of low frequency subspace
Results in the previous section support our hypothesis
that restricting the search space to LF-DCT substantially
increases the sample success rate of random adversarial
directions. However, the dimensionality reduction does
impose a restriction on the possible solutions of attack
algorithms. To examine the effects of this limitation, we
apply our low-frequency restriction to white-box attacks
by projecting the gradient onto the LF-DCT space.
Low frequency gradient descent. Let `y denote the ad-
versarial loss, e.g. Equation 1. For a given r ∈ (0, 1] and
v ∈ Rrd×rd, define V ∈ Rd×d by
Vi,j =
{
vi,j if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ rd
0 otherwise,
The wave coefficient matrix V contains v as its submatrix
and only includes frequencies lower than rd. The low
frequency perturbation domain can then be parametrized
as ∆ = IDCT(V ). To optimize with gradient descent, let
∆¯ and V¯ be vectorizations of ∆ and V , i.e., ∆¯i1∗d+i2 =
∆i1,i2 and similarly for V¯ . From Equation 2, it is easy to
see that each coordinate of ∆¯ is a linear function of V¯ ,
hence IDCT is a linear transformation, whose adjoint is
precisely the linear transformation defined by DCT. For
any vector z, its right-product with the Jacobian of IDCT
RGB (r = 1) LF-DCT (r = 1/8) LF-DCT (r = 1/16) LF-DCT (r = 1/32)
Figure 3: A sample image perturbed by the Carlini-
Wagner attack using the full image space and low fre-
quency space with different r. The adversarial pertur-
bation (second row) has clearly different pattern across
different frequency ranges.
d′ MSE Success Rate (%)
RGB (r = 1) 150528 2.78× 10−5 100.0
LF-DCT (r = 1/8) 2352 6.94× 10−5 100.0
LF-DCT (r = 1/16) 588 1.61× 10−4 95.5
LF-DCT (r = 1/32) 147 1.56× 10−4 56.0
Table 1: Average MSE and accuracy after Carlini-Wagner
attack with different frequency ratios r. d′ = 3×rd×rd is
the effective adversarial space dimensionality. At r = 1/8,
optimizing in the frequency space of dimensionality 2352
is as effective as optimizing in the full image space.
is given by JIDCT ·z = DCT(z). Thus we may apply the
chain rule to compute
∂`
∂V
= DCT
(
∂`
∂∆
)
,
∂`
∂v
=
[
∂`
∂V
]
1:rd,1:rd
,
which is equivalent to applying DCT to the gradient and
dropping the high frequency coefficients.
Adversarial optimality in low frequency subspace. Ta-
ble 1 shows average perturbation MSE and model accu-
racy after the Carlini-Wagner attack [Carlini and Wagner,
2017] in low frequency space. The original attack in pixel
space corresponds to r = 1. The images have three color
channels and the effective subspace dimensionality is
d′ = 3×rd×rd. For r = 1/8, the attack can achieve per-
fect (100%) success rate, while the resulting MSE is only
roughly 3 times larger — despite that the search space
dimensionality is only 1/64 of the full image space. This
result further supports that the density of adversarial ex-
amples is much higher in the low frequency domain, and
that searching exclusively in this restricted subspace con-
sistently yields near-optimal adversarial perturbations. As
expected, choosing a very small frequency ratio eventu-
ally impacts success rate, as the subspace dimensionality
is too low to admit adversarial perturbations. Figure 3
shows the resulting adversarial images and perturbations
corresponding to frequency ratios r. All perturbations
Figure 4: Illustration of a single iteration of the low fre-
quency boundary attack. Instead of sampling the noise
matrix η from N(0, 1)d×d, we sample a low frequency
noise matrix by applying IDCT to the Gaussian noise
while removing high frequency components.
are imperceptible but when isolated (bottom row) reveal
increasingly smooth patterns as r decreases.
Advantages of low frequency perturbation. While the
remainder of this paper focuses on the benefits of low
frequency adversarial perturbation in the black-box set-
ting, we highlight that there are advantages in the white-
box setting as well. Sharma, Ding, and Brubaker [2019]
showed that low frequency gradient-based attacks enjoy
greater efficiency and can transfer significantly better to
defended models. In particular, their attack is able to com-
pletely circumvent all of the top-placing defense entries
at the NeurIPS 2017 competition. Furthermore, they ob-
serve that the benefit of low frequency perturbation is
not merely due to dimensionality reduction — perturbing
exclusively the high frequency components does not give
the same benefit.
4 APPLICATION TO BLACK-BOX
ATTACKS
Many existing black-box attacks proceed by iteratively
adding random noise to the current image and evaluating
the model to determine the direction to move towards.
Given our insights regarding the effectiveness of low fre-
quency perturbations, we propose its use as a universal
tool for improving the query efficiency of black-box at-
tacks. We conduct case studies on the boundary attack
[Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge, 2017] and the NES attack
[Ilyas et al., 2018] to demonstrate the efficacy and acces-
sibility of our method.
4.1 Case study: Boundary attack
The boundary attack uses an iterative update rule to grad-
ually move the adversarial image closer to the original
image, maintaining that the image remains adversarial
at each step. Starting from random noise, the algorithm
samples a noise matrix η ∼ N(0, 1)d×d at each itera-
tion and adds it to the current iterate z after appropriate
scaling. This point is then projected onto the sphere of
center x, the target image, and radius ‖z‖2 so that the
next iterate never moves away from x. Finally, we con-
tract towards x by , and the new iterate z˜ is accepted only
if it remains adversarial. This guarantees that terminating
the algorithm at any point still results in an adversarial
image, but the perturbation magnitude reduces with each
contraction step.
Modification. To construct low frequency perturbation
using the boundary attack, we constrain the noise ma-
trix η to be sampled from IDCTr(N(0, 1)d×d) instead.
Figure 4 illustrates the modified attack. Sampling low
frequency noise instead of Gaussian noise is particularly
beneficial to the boundary attack: After adding the noise
matrix η, if the iterate is not adversarial, the algorithm
must re-sample a noise matrix and perform another model
query. By restricting to the low frequency subspace, which
has a larger density of adversarial directions, this step suc-
ceeds more often, speeding up convergence towards the
target image. We term this variant of the boundary at-
tack as low frequency boundary attack (LF-BA) and the
original boundary attack as RGB-BA.
Hyperparameters. The boundary attack has two hyper-
parameters: noise step size δ and contraction step size .
Both step sizes are adjusted based on the success rate of
the past few candidates, i.e., if z˜ is accepted often, we
can contract towards the target x more aggressively by
increasing  and vice versa, and similarly for δ. For the
low frequency variant, we find that fixing δ to a large
value is beneficial for speeding up convergence, while
also reducing the number of model queries by half. For
all experiments, we fix δ = 0.2 and initialize  = 0.01.
Selecting the frequency ratio r is more crucial. Differ-
ent images may admit adversarial perturbations at differ-
ent frequency ranges, and thus we would like the algo-
rithm to automatically discover the right frequency on a
per-image basis. We use Hyperband [Li et al., 2016], a
bandit-type algorithm for selecting hyperparameters, to
optimize the frequency ratio r. We initialize Hyperband
with multiple runs of the attack for every frequency ratio
r ∈ { 14 , 18 , 116 , 132}. Repeatedly after T ′ iterations, the
least successful half of the parallel runs is terminated un-
til one final frequency remains. This setting is continued
until the total number of model queries reaches T .
4.2 Case study: NES attack
Natural evolution strategies (NES) [Wierstra et al., 2014]
is a black-box optimization technique that has been re-
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of queries required for a successful attack (defined as achieving a perturbation
MSE of 0.001 or lower for RGB-BA/LF-BA). See text for details.
cently proposed for its use in black-box attacks [Ilyas et
al., 2018]. The attacker constructs the adversarial image
z by minimizing a continuous-valued adversarial loss `
returned by black-box query to the model. However, in-
stead of minimizing ` directly, the NES attack minimizes
the loss at all points near z. More precisely, we specify a
search distribution D and minimize:
min
z
Eη∼D[`(z + η)] subject to d(x, z) ≤ ρ, (3)
where ρ is some perceptibility threshold. When the search
distribution D is chosen to be an isotropic Gaussian, i.e.
D = N(0, σ2)d×d, the gradient of the objective function
in Equation 3 becomes
∇zEη∼D[`(z + η)] = 1
σ2
Eη∼D[`(z + η) · η].
Thus, Equation 3 can be minimized with stochastic
gradient descent by sampling a batch of noise vectors
η1, . . . , ηm ∼ N(0, σ2)d×d and computing the (mini-
batch) stochastic gradient
∇zEη∼D[`(z + η)] ≈ 1
mσ2
m∑
i=1
`(z + ηi) · ηi. (4)
One way to interpret this update rule is that the procedure
pushes z away from regions of low adversarial density —
directions ηi for which `(z+ηi) is high. The perceptibility
constraint can be enforced by projecting to the feasible
region at every step. For this attack, the max-norm ‖·‖∞ is
used as the perceptibility metric, hence the projection step
reduces to clipping of each dimension in the adversarial
perturbation to the range [−ρ, ρ].
Modification. The low frequency distribution defined in
section 3 can be readily incorporated into the NES attack.
We replace the Gaussian search distribution with its low
frequency version, i.e. we sample a batch of noise vec-
tors η1, . . . , ηm ∼ IDCTr(N(0, σ2)d×d) instead. The
stochastic gradient remains identical to Equation 4. Note
that since each ηi is low-frequency, this process results
in a low frequency adversarial perturbation. We term the
original NES attack using search distribution in pixel
space as RGB-NES and the low frequency variant as low
frequency NES (LF-NES).
Hyperparameters. The NES attack has two hyperparam-
eters: ρ, which controls the perceptibility of adversarial
perturbation, and σ, which controls the width of the search
distribution. We set ρ = 0.03 to match the average L2-
norm of perturbations generated by RGB-BA/LF-BA, and
set σ = 0.001 as suggested by the authors. Intriguingly,
the frequency ratio r is not very sensitive for LF-NES.
Setting a single value of r for all images is sufficiently
effective, and we choose the same value of r = 1/2 in all
of our experiments for simplicity.
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We empirically validate our claims that black-box attacks
in low frequency space possess the aforementioned desir-
able properties. For all experiments, we use the default Py-
Torch pretrained ResNet-50 model for RGB-BA/LF-BA
and the Tensorflow-Slim pretrained ResNet-50 model1
for RGB-NES/LF-NES.
Both RGB-BA and LF-BA use a 10 step binary search
along the line joining the random initialization and the tar-
get image before starting the attack. Our implementation
of the boundary attack in PyTorch has comparable perfor-
mance to the official implementation by Brendel, Rauber,
and Bethge [2017] while being significantly faster. We
use the official implementation of NES in Tensorflow and
modify it to use low frequency search distribution. We
release our code2 publicly for reproducibility.
Settings. For experiments on ImageNet [Deng et al.,
2009], we evaluate both untargeted attack (RGB-BA/LF-
1https://github.com/tensorflow/models/
tree/master/research/slim
2https://github.com/cg563/
low-frequency-adversarial
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Figure 6: Average (log) MSE across queries for RGB-
BA and LF-BA against different image transformation
defenses. Against JPEG and bit depth reduction defenses,
RGB-BA fail to make progress. In contrast, LF-BA can
successfully circumvent these defenses and reduce aver-
age MSE to 0.001 after 30, 000 model queries.
BA) and targeted attack (RGB-NES/LF-NES) to a random
class against a pretrained ResNet-50 [He et al., 2016]
model. Each test image is randomly selected from the
validation set while ensuring correct prediction by the re-
spective models. For RGB-BA/LF-BA, the adversary can
only access the binary output of the model corresponding
to whether the input is classified as the original label. For
RGB-NES/LF-NES, the adversary can obtain the cross
entropy loss of the model against the target label.
We limit the attack algorithm to 30, 000 queries for un-
targeted attack, corresponding to 30, 000 iterations for
LF-BA and 15, 000 for RGB-BA3, and 100, 000 queries
for targeted attack using RGB-NES/LF-NES. For LF-BA,
we select the frequency ratio r using Hyperband by halv-
ing the number of parallel runs every T ′ = 500 iterations.
Query histogram. Figure 5 shows the histogram of the
number of model queries required for a successful at-
tack over 1000 sampled images. The left plot shows re-
sult for untargeted attack using RGB-BA/LF-BA. Since
the boundary attack maintains an incorrectly labeled im-
age throughout optimization while gradually reducing
the perturbation norm, we define success as achieving a
sufficiently low perceptibility of < 0.001 MSE (or equiv-
alently, an L2-norm of 12.27). The results for targeted
attacks using RGB-NES/LF-NES are in the right plot.
Only successful runs are included in this plot. We make
several key observations:
1. The query distribution of RGB-BA (light orange) and
RGB-NES (light blue) are heavy-tailed, that is, the entire
range of allowed number of queries is covered, which
shows that a large number of model queries is necessary
3RGB-BA requires two model queries per iteration, one after
the noise step and one after the contraction.
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Figure 7: Plot of the average perturbation MSE across
iterations for LF-BA using different frequency ratios r.
See text for details.
for many images.
2. The histograms of LF-BA (dark red) and LF-NES (dark
blue) are shifted left compared to their Gaussian-based
counterparts. This demonstrates that using the low fre-
quency noise samples consistently improves the query
efficiency of the boundary attack and the NES attack.
This effect is especially dramatic for LF-BA, where a
large fraction of images require only roughly 1000 model
queries to construct.
3. Both the median (dashed line) and mean (dotted line)
query counts are significantly reduced when using LF-BA
and LF-NES. In particular, LF-BA requires 1128 median
queries, an almost 4x reduction compared to the 4020
median queries of RGB-BA. Similarly, LF-NES requires
12, 444 median queries, an approximately 2x reduction
from the 22, 389 median queries of RGB-NES.
Selecting frequency ratio r. In Figure 7 we analyze the
effect of selecting the hyperparameter r by either fixing it
to a pre-defined value or by using Hyperband. The average
MSE of adversarial perturbations constructed by LF-BA
is plotted against the number of iterations. All averages
are computed over the same 1000 random images from
the ImageNet validation set.
At higher values of r, the perturbation MSE drops rapidly
for the first 2500 iterations but progress stalls later on.
Lower values of r (e.g. purple and dark red lines) allow
the attack algorithm to (relatively) slowly but eventually
find an adversarial perturbation with low MSE. This plot
demonstrates the need for selecting r adaptively based on
the image, as Hyperband (black line) selects the optimal
frequency ratio to allow both rapid descent initially and
continued progress later on.
Breaking image transformation defenses. One com-
mon defense strategy against adversarial images is to
apply a denoising transformation before feeding it into
the model. This style of defense has been shown to be
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Figure 8: Image samples for attacking image transformation defenses. Perturbation MSE is truncated to 8 decimal
places and images with MSE higher than 0.001 are highlighted in red. See text for details.
Untargeted
Attack Average queries Average L2 Average MSE
Opt-attack 71, 100 6.98 3.24× 10−4
RGB-BA 14, 217 - -
LF-BA 2926 - -
Targeted
Attack Average queries Success rate Average L2 Average MSE
AutoZOOM 13, 525 100% 26.74 3.64× 10−3
RGB-NES 31, 879 94.7% 6.85 3.22× 10−4
LF-NES 17, 558 98.6% 6.92 3.18× 10−4
Table 2: Comparison of aggregate statistics on ImageNet. All statistics are averaged over 1000 random validation
images. See text for details.
highly effective against transfer-based attacks [Guo et
al., 2017] and have not exhibited any weakness against
black-box attacks to-date. However, we suspect that low
frequency perturbations can circumvent this defense since
denoising transformations do not typically operate on the
lower frequency spectrum.
We test our hypothesis by evaluating RGB-BA and LF-
BA against the following image transformation defenses:
JPEG compression [Dziugaite, Ghahramani, and Roy,
2016] at quality level 75 and reducing bit depth [Xu,
Evans, and Qi, 2017] to 3 bits. To avoid artificially inflat-
ing success rate, we choose initial images to be correctly
classified after the defensive transformation is applied.
Figure 6 compares the average perturbation (log) MSE
across model queries for both attacks on 1000 random
images across iterations. Again, we see that LF-BA (solid
line) converges significantly faster than RGB-BA (dashed
line) when the model is undefended (dark red lines). In
fact, it reaches the same average MSE achieved by RGB-
BA after 30, 000 model queries in less than 3000 queries –
constituting an order of magnitude reduction. When either
the JPEG (blue lines) or bit depth (orange lines) reduction
transformation is applied, RGB-BA fails to make any
progress. This result shows that image transformation
defenses are very potent against black-box attacks. On
the other hand, LF-BA can circumvent these defenses
consistently and reduce the average perturbation MSE
to approximately 0.001 after 30, 000 model queries. The
success of LF-BA does not rely on the knowledge of the
exact transformation being applied.
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Figure 9: Attacking Google Cloud Vision. MSE of value higher than 0.001 is colored in red. See text for details.
Figure 8 shows adversarially perturbed images produced
when attacking different image transformation defenses.
On the undefended model, there is no visible difference
between the clean image and the perturbed image when
attacking with either Gaussian or low frequency noise. On
defended models, RGB-BA consistently fails to produce
an imperceptible perturbation, while LF-BA is success-
ful with high probability. Note the color patch pattern
produced by LF-BA has varying frequency, which is opti-
mally selected by Hyperband. The last image represents a
failure case for both RGB-BA and LF-BA.
Additional baselines. Table 2 shows aggregate query
and perturbation norm statistics for untargeted RGB-
BA/LF-BA attacks and targeted RGB-NES/LF-NES at-
tacks in comparison to two additional baselines: Opt-
attack [Cheng et al., 2018] and AutoZOOM [Tu et al.,
2018]. We duplicate relevant numbers reported in the
original paper for both baselines. Since RGB-BA/LF-BA
gradually reduce perturbation magnitude at the expense
of additional queries, we set a target average L2-norm
equal to that of Opt-attack and compare query cost. For
RGB-NES/LF-NES, we fix the same maximum number
of queries to 100, 000 as AutoZOOM, and compare query
count and perturbation magnitude at initial success.
Note that LF-BA requires 5x fewer queries than RGB-BA
and 24x fewer queries than Opt-attack to reach the same
average L2-norm/MSE, constituting an order of magni-
tude reduction. For targeted attack, LF-NES requires only
half as many queries as RGB-NES to reach the same
perturbation norm while having higher success rate. Com-
pared to AutoZOOM, LF-NES requires approximately
the same number of average queries while achieving a
nearly 4x reduction of perturbation L2-norm.
Attacking Google Cloud Vision. To demonstrate the re-
alistic threat of low frequency perturbations, we attack
Google Cloud Vision, a popular online machine learn-
ing service. The platform provides a top concept label-
ing functionality: when given an image, it outputs a list
of top (predicted) concepts contained in the image and
their associated confidence. We define a successful attack
as replacing the formerly highest ranked concept with a
new concept that was previously not present in the list,
while obtaining an MSE ≤ 0.001. Figure 9 shows the
progression of the boundary attack with Gaussian and
low frequency noise across iterations. On the image with
original top concept dog breed, LF-BA produces an adver-
sarial image with imperceptible difference while changing
the top concept to close-up. Even with only 1000 model
queries, the adversarial perturbation is already reason-
ably unobtrusive. In contrast, RGB-BA could not find a
sufficiently minimal perturbation within 4000 iterations
(=8000 queries). Note that neither method makes use of
the prediction confidence or the rank of concepts other
than the top-1, contrasting with the previous known attack
against this platform [Ilyas et al., 2018].
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that adversarial attacks on images can be
performed by exclusively perturbing low frequency por-
tions of the input signal. This approach provides substan-
tial benefits for attacks in the black-box setting and can be
readily incorporated into many existing algorithms. Our
follow-up work [Guo et al., 2019] that achieves state-of-
the-art query efficiency using a simple coordinate descent-
style attack also leverages the abundance of adversarial
perturbations in the low frequency subspace.
Focusing on low frequency signal is by no means ex-
clusively applicable to images. It is likely that similar
approaches can be used to attack speech recognition sys-
tems [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] or time series data. An-
other promising future direction is to find other subspaces
that may admit a higher density of adversarial perturba-
tions. Any success in this direction can also provide us
with insight into the space of adversarial examples.
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